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Introduction 
 
 
Repressing Egypt’s Civil Society 
State Violence, Restriction of the Public Sphere, and Extrajudicial Persecution 
Jannis Grimm 
Since the military coup of July 2013, one of the characteristics of the Egyptian regime 
has been the lack of clarity on the boundaries of political activism and on what activities 
it would, or would not, tolerate. Red lines have been shifting frequently, as a plethora 
of presidential decrees has restricted the public sphere ever more. Furthermore, state 
institutions and investigating bodies have increasingly abused their powers against 
civil society representatives. Torture, arbitrary detention and enforced disappearances 
have become recurrent phenomena. Embattled by State Security, a politicized judiciary 
and competing ministries, human rights activists are less and less able to fulfil their 
role as watchdogs. From being merely the witnesses of assaults and human rights viola-
tions by the security forces, they have moved on to being their primary targets. Against 
this backdrop, Germany and its European partners should pressure the Egyptian 
authorities for compliance with basic civil rights and the rule of law, while aligning 
their support more closely with the needs of Egyptian NGOs. 
 
On 4 May 2015, the Cairo Institute for 
Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) published 
a joint declaration of the leading non-
governmental human rights organizations 
(HROs) in Egypt. It expressed their massive 
criticism of the authorities’ “increasingly 
aggressive actions”, which the HROs saw as 
an attempt to “slowly strangle the work” of 
Egyptian rights groups. At the same time, 
the signatories reminded the government 
of its commitment vis-à-vis the UN Human 
Rights Council: in March 2015, during the 
periodical review of the condition of human 
rights in Egypt, the leadership in Cairo had 
accepted most of the recommendations out-
lined by the international community to 
improve the situation. In a statement, it 
had pledged to rethink its controversial 
protest law as well as its legislation on NGOs. 
In this context, it had also emphasized the 
role of civil society as an essential partner 
in strengthening human rights. 
However, these declarations were merely 
lip service: the military and police routinely 
continue to use arbitrary or indiscriminate 
violence against members of the opposition. 
Torture is par for the course, as the statis-
tics of the El Nadeem Center for the Reha-
bilitation of Victims of Torture prove. In 
addition, there is an increasing number of 
reports of the security forces systematically 
using sexual violence against prisoners and 
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demonstrators in general, and homosexuals 
and transsexuals in particular. Even the 
state-run National Council for Human Rights 
(NCHR), which is mostly staffed by those 
loyal to the regime and therefore tends to 
be conservative in the number of victims it 
reports, more and more frequently criti-
cizes serious human rights abuses. These 
are committed not only against members 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has been 
banned since autumn 2013. According to 
NCHR reports, there were also 550 people 
without any personal ties to the Islamists 
among the more than 1,900 civilians killed 
between the summer of 2013 and the end 
of 2014. The number of unreported cases is 
presumably even higher. 
Restricting the Public Sphere 
In the absence of a parliament (dissolved 
in the summer of 2012), the room for 
manoeuvre of civil society actors has been 
systematically restricted through a series 
of presidential decrees. The work of local 
and foreign NGOs, but also of parties, trade 
unions and youth groups, has been made 
more difficult, particularly through the 
vaguely worded new law on assembly; the 
tightened rules on foreign funding; the 
introduction of an obligation to register; 
and such groups being placed under the 
control of the Ministry of Social Solidarity. 
Ambiguous wording in the legal texts is in 
no way an expression of legislative incom-
petence. Given that in other policy realms 
provisions were formulated with noticeably 
more precision – for instance, in the new 
investment law – it stands to reason that 
the lack of terminological clarity is in fact a 
tactic for unsettling potential critics of the 
regime and giving the relevant authorities 
a maximum of discretion. In July 2014, in a 
memorandum addressed to Prime Minister 
Ibrahim Mahlab, a coalition of the most 
important national HROs already referred 
to a “declaration of war” on civil society. In 
this, the national leadership under Abdel 
Fattah al-Sisi has been relying above all on 
the judiciary to act as implementing body. 
In contrast to the Mubarak regime, which 
sought to stem dissent using mostly illegal 
intimidation tactics, the al-Sisi adminis-
tration is pursuing a strategy of legalizing 
repression. The over 175 presidential de-
crees issued since July 2013 mark out a 
restrictive framework that makes authori-
tarian rule possible without the need to 
impose emergency rule. 
The Egyptian authorities have gradually 
limited civil society’s freedom of action 
and extended their repressive measures to 
include different segments of society. Fol-
lowing the military coup in July 2013, a 
first phase saw the persecution primarily 
of the supporters of the deposed President 
Mohamed Morsi. When the Muslim Brother-
hood was designated a terrorist organiza-
tion in late 2013, this explicitly placed it 
within the jurisdiction of State Security, 
allowing its agents to raid and seize Islamist 
charities and civic associations under the 
pretext that they maintained ties to the 
group or its members. 
The January 2014 Constitution then 
contained an article that declared the fight 
against “all types and manifestations of ter-
rorism” to be a national goal, and endowed 
the security services with far-reaching pow-
ers. Since then, the regime has repeatedly 
modified its definition of terrorism by de-
cree, expanding it each time to include a 
new set of criminal offenses. As a result, not 
only the Muslim Brotherhood but all actors 
critical of the regime or contradicting its 
narratives on contentious events in Egypt 
may now be persecuted by State Security 
on the pretext that they threaten the public 
order or national unity, and be prosecuted 
by special courts for terrorism-related felo-
nies and misdemeanors. The latest legis-
lation from mid-August 2015 expands the 
list of offenses to be tried as terrorist crimes 
to include even private expressions of sup-
port for groups blacklisted by the judiciary 
as terrorist entities. Rights groups have 
slammed the new law as an attempt to 
establish “thought crime” as a punishable 
offense and pointed to its “Orwellian” 
character. 
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A new protest law had already effectively 
barred all public shows of solidarity with 
such groups. Responding to the daily mass 
protests that had been organized through-
out the country by circles sympathetic to 
the Muslim Brothers under the umbrella of 
the so-called Anti-Coup Alliance, this piece 
of legislation from November 2013 limits 
the right to strike and the freedom of assem-
bly on pain of severe penalties. It subjects 
all collective action to prior police authori-
zation, specifying that the organizers of any 
demonstration must present themselves at 
the responsible police station with their 
itinerary, the number of participants and 
the names of those in charge, seven days in 
advance. Violating this procedure or the 
vague requirement not to impair the coun-
try’s “productivity” through protests is 
prosecuted as a crime. 
This protest law has led to a de facto ban 
on all demonstrations since the authorities 
issue hardly any authorizations. The law 
is increasingly being used retroactively as 
well. It is now the most common pretext 
for prosecuting Egypt’s more than 40,000 
political prisoners, including prominent 
activists of the Tahrir Revolution such as 
the blogger Ahmed Douma or the human 
rights lawyer Yara Sallam. 
The protest law was complemented by a 
presidential decree of 27 October 2014 that 
categorized nearly all public institutions as 
military installations – with the result that 
all crimes committed there can be pros-
ecuted before military courts (including 
retroactively). This includes not only elec-
tricity plants, pipelines, railway stations 
and bridges but also the Egyptian universi-
ties that have become the hotbeds of resist-
ance against the autocratic rollback after 
the severe crackdown on the Anti-Coup 
street protests. 
Restrictions on the Freedom of Assembly 
Since late 2014, the security apparatus 
has also increasingly been targeting non-
partisan civil society organizations working 
for the common good without any explicit 
political agenda or formal affiliation with 
a political camp. This particularly concerns 
human rights organizations, which, in the 
absence of independent media or a working 
separation of institutional powers, have 
taken on the important function of moni-
toring the executive. Those witnessing and 
documenting the repression and human 
rights violations committed by the security 
apparatus are now increasingly becoming 
its victims. 
In June 2014, social minister Ghada Waly 
announced a new draft law to regulate 
the work of NGOs, which was intended to 
replace the Mubarak-era association law 
84/2002. NGOs were to be prohibited from 
participating in political activities as well 
as from carrying out unauthorized field 
research, data collection, or publishing. 
A supervisory authority with the power 
of veto was to control the registration, 
funding and personnel decisions of NGOs 
working in Egypt. A particular source of 
concern was the indication that represen-
tatives of State Security and the Ministry 
of Interior would also be sitting on the 
committee. 
Because of massive public criticism, 
the law has so far been held back. However, 
a predecessor law has since been applied 
more consistently. NGOs had to formally 
register by 10 November 2014, thereby 
placing their work content and structure 
under the auspices of the Ministry of Social 
Solidarity. At first glance a mere formality, 
this procedure drastically curtailed the 
principle of freedom of association guaran-
teed in the Egyptian constitution – in par-
ticular because of the large amount of dis-
cretion that the vaguely worded paragraphs 
of the law afford the authorities. For in-
stance, article 11 states that an association 
may be refused approval if its activities risk 
endangering national security or the public 
order and morals, or if it represents the 
vested interests of individual parties or 
trade unions. In addition, article 17 pro-
hibits associations from accepting monies 
from abroad without the Ministry’s express 
agreement. This provision is made even 
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stricter by a revision of the criminal law, 
which was determined in September 2014 
by presidential decree. Paragraph 78 now 
strictly defines as an offence the receiving 
of money or benefits in kind from abroad, 
wherever they are used to endanger the 
public order or national interest. Violations 
of these provisions – once again deliberately 
kept vague – are punishable by heavy fines 
and prison sentences. Government em-
ployees even risk the death penalty. 
The paragraph is formulated so as to be 
open to interpretation, which suggests that 
it might potentially also apply to foreign 
journalists or employees of international 
organizations. These include the German 
political foundations, which have been 
unable to work as intended ever since the 
verdict against the Konrad Adenauer Foun-
dation for illegal money transfers and lack 
of a licence in Egypt. Some international 
organizations, such as Human Rights Watch 
or the Carter Foundation, have in the mean-
time closed their Cairo offices. 
HROs: Unprotected and Powerless 
Egyptian human rights organizations have 
been pursuing very different strategies of 
adaptation so as to retain their freedom 
of action within the restrictive legal frame-
work. In the light of the legal grey areas 
and the certainty that even a potential clari-
fication of their institutional status would 
not protect individual members from per-
secution, they did not, in fact, register en 
masse before the deadline. According to 
the Ministry, about 45,000 HROs were 
registered nationwide by the deadline, but 
among Egypt’s large human rights groups 
so far only the Egyptian Initiative for Per-
sonal Rights (EIPR) has done so, in early 
2015, avowedly to set a precedent for Egyp-
tian HROs – though it also announced that 
it intended to continue working towards 
democratic reform of the law. 
By contrast, other groups, such as 
Al-Mawred al-Thaqafy, discontinued their 
work just before the deadline expired; yet 
others, including the CIHRS, moved a part 
of their staff abroad. Some groups simply 
ignored the deadline. The Arabic Network 
for Human Rights Information (ANHRI), 
for example, pointed out that the NGO law 
was undemocratic and that the ANHRI was 
a law firm. This tactic was adopted by other 
NGOs as well, which registered as media 
production companies, limited liability 
companies or law firms – sectors where 
regulation is noticeably less restrictive – 
so as to circumvent the mandatory registra-
tion. However, it remains unclear whether 
this absolves organizations from addition-
ally having to register under the NGO law. 
Ultimately, this is at the discretion of the 
Ministry for Social Solidarity. The registra-
tion requirement thus gives the Ministry 
the possibility of leaving civil society groups 
in the dark regarding their legal status – all 
the more so, considering that the Ministry’s 
60-day grace period for deciding on sub-
mitted registration requests can be arbi-
trarily extended for administrative reasons. 
Besides, non-registration is becoming 
an increasingly unattractive option: in June 
2015, the Ministry began to make good its 
threats of legal action against unregistered 
NGOs. On the other hand, even an unequivo-
cally clarified status does not provide suf-
ficient protection from prosecution. For 
example, the Egyptian Democratic Acad-
emy (EDA), despite having registered on 
time, was subjected to a criminal investiga-
tion into its funding sources – alongside 
the unregistered human rights organiza-
tions CIHRS, the Hisham Mubarak Law 
Center and the Egyptian Center for Eco-
nomic and Social Rights. 
Extrajudicial Persecution 
The limits of the protection afforded by a 
clarified legal status were made obvious in 
early June 2015, with the publication of the 
first substantiated numbers on the relative-
ly new phenomenon of extrajudicial forced 
disappearances. According to the group 
Freedom of the Brave, which campaigns 
for prisoners’ rights, over 160 people were 
kidnapped between early April and early 
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June. The Egyptian Coordination for Rights 
and Freedoms (ECRF), a coalition of lawyers 
that investigate the whereabouts of disap-
peared Muslim Brothers, identified almost 
1,000 people that have gone missing since 
the start of 2015. What is more, both or-
ganizations point to the rapid increase in 
kidnappings, which are carried out mainly 
by security forces in plainclothes on the 
street, but also in private flats or the cam-
puses of state universities. Until recently, 
the kidnapping of unwelcome citizens – 
such as the photo journalist Omar Abdel 
Maqsoud, who in autumn 2014 had re-
ported on the abuse of his wife in police cus-
tody – remained exceptions that attracted 
a great deal of attention. This makes the 
current wave of kidnappings even more 
alarming – it marks a new dimension in 
the abuse of state power. 
While dozens are still missing, some of 
those kidnapped have now been released. 
Others were eventually found in the Egyp-
tian jails of Tora, al-Qanater and al-Aqrab. 
In several cases, activists whose location 
had been discovered were brought before 
a magistrate on a litany of trumped-up 
charges so as to legitimize their detention 
retroactively. The charges brought ranged 
from membership in a banned organization 
(such as the April 6 Youth Movement) to 
violating strike bans, to spreading false news 
and murdering policemen. In other cases, 
pre-trial detention was renewed without 
any formal charges by the prosecution. 
The Ministry of Interior, which formally 
administers Egyptian prisons, either does 
not comment on kidnappings or else denies 
that they have taken place, making reference 
to their illegality. However, even individual 
representatives of the NCHR attribute pri-
mary responsibility for the kidnappings to 
State Security, which is directly assigned to 
the Ministry of Interior. This interpretation 
is backed up among other things by the fact 
that the forced disappearances are not lim-
ited to a few districts, which come under 
the jurisdiction of certain governors or 
local police stations, but are a nationwide 
phenomenon. 
The location of the kidnappings and 
witness statements of the way they unfold 
show that the perpetrators are highly pro-
fessional and well-informed. In this context, 
it is surprising, at least at first sight, that 
the kidnappings are not more targeted. The 
victims do include some members of the 
banned April 6 Youth Movement and leaders 
of the protest coalition Students against the 
Coup, which is sympathetic to the Muslim 
Brotherhood. However, other victims can-
not be assigned to any banned group, and 
have in some cases not been politically 
active for some time. The case of Esraa 
el-Taweel is emblematic in this regard. An 
amateur photographer, she retired from 
activism after receiving a gunshot wound 
as she photographed the protests on the 
2014 anniversary of the January 25th revo-
lution. She disappeared in early June 2015 
along with two friends. Only after intensive 
searches carried out by relatives and a 
broad solidarity campaign in social media 
was she identified in al-Qanater women’s 
prison and subsequently brought before a 
prosecutor. She remains in custody to date 
with her provisional detention being re-
newed on a monthly basis pending further 
investigation into the charges of belonging 
to a terrorist organisation. 
The fact that prominent human rights 
activists and journalists have so far been 
spared kidnappings is not a result of the 
security apparatus’ incompetence. For un-
like the ministerial bureaucracies in Cairo, 
State Security is highly effective. Mubarak’s 
infamous State Security Investigations 
Service (SSIS, Amn ad-Dawla) may have been 
formally dissolved in March 2011, but it 
continues to operate with largely the same 
personnel under the umbrella of the newly-
founded Egyptian Homeland Security (EHS, 
Al-Amn Al-Watani). The absence of in-depth 
reforms of the security sector since 2011 has 
enabled the agency to take up the secret-
service structures and informant networks 
that had grown up over the decades of the 
Mubarak era. This has been demonstrated 
not least in the highly efficient campaign 
of arrests against the Muslim Brotherhood 
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and its members after the violent dis-
persal of their protest camps in Rabaa 
al-Adawiya and Nahda in mid-August 2013, 
which caused hundreds of deaths. By May 
2015, the security forces had managed to 
arrest thousands of sympathizers and 
members as well as the most important 
leaders of the Brotherhood and its allies 
in the protest coalition against the Sisi 
regime. 
Divides in the Regime Coalition 
The selective restraint shown by State Secu-
rity towards leading representatives of the 
non-Islamist parts of civil society in fact 
point to differences within the regime. The 
country’s most influential actor, the army, 
rarely takes a position and is only indirectly 
involved in the repression – through the 
military justice system, to which the public 
prosecutor’s office has transferred over 2,200 
civilians in the few months since October 
2014. However, beyond the institutional 
boundaries, at least two camps can be iden-
tified in the repressive triad of army, do-
mestic security and judiciary, two camps 
that pursue divergent strategies on dealing 
with civil society. 
The Ministry for Social Solidarity, For-
eign Ministry and Ministry of Finance repre-
sent the approach of restricting the oppo-
sition under cover of the law. They are thus 
a counter-weight to those who advocate a 
policy of intransigent extrajudicial repres-
sion. Like the President’s office, the minis-
tries insist on maintaining a pluralistic 
façade, apparently for strategic reasons – 
and especially with an eye on normalizing 
diplomatic relations with Egypt’s tradition-
al western partners, for which they strive. 
In addition, they benefit from NGO exper-
tise in fighting corruption within the ad-
ministrative apparatus and in formulating 
draft laws, for instance in the adoption of 
a criminal-law article against sexual harass-
ment. Last but not least, NGO reports on 
transgressions by the security apparatus are 
useful tools in potential conflicts with the 
domestic security services. 
These institutions in turn – in particu-
lar State Security – can be identified as 
the driving forces behind the campaign of 
repression, alongside the judiciary. A range 
of leaked files and inquiries have illustrated 
how the internal security agencies very 
carefully prepared a series of legal actions 
against NGOs on suspicion of “espionage 
under the cover of civil society work” and 
against opposition media for “false report-
ing” and “deliberate disinformation”. Activ-
ists furthermore confirm the existence of 
blacklists of organizations and individuals 
who have been identified as potential tar-
gets for prosecution and ascribe the fact 
that these have not yet been processed 
primarily to circles in the president’s office 
around security advisor Faiza Abu-l-Naga, 
which fear that the West may impose 
sanctions. 
This might also explain why the kidnap-
pers have so far largely concentrated on the 
grassroots and middle ranks of civil society 
organizations. Persecuting these actors at-
tracts noticeably less attention than kid-
napping human rights defenders who are 
part of international networks. This keeps 
the foreign-policy costs of the kidnappings 
low. In addition, it is almost impossible to 
prove state responsibility. The degree of dif-
ficulty involved in independently confirm-
ing the accusations made by Egyptian HROs 
is shown among other factors by the fact 
that the UN Working Group on Enforced 
or Involuntary Disappearances has been 
refused entry into Egypt since 2011. At the 
same time, every kidnapping creates a fait 
accompli that is hardly revisable, strengthen-
ing those responsible inside the regime coa-
lition: When kidnappings become known, 
the various regime factions present a united 
front in public and, if necessary, begin retro-
active legal proceedings so as to legalize the 
arrests. 
Last but not least, targeted kidnappings 
have a preventative effect on the opposition 
in general. The primary addressee of the 
kidnapping is not necessarily the victim 
himself or herself. Rather, the abduction 
of former activists such as el-Taweel sends a 
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signal that even withdrawing from human 
rights work does not provide protection 
from persecution, any more than the legal 
process does. The deaths of kidnapping vic-
tims, for example the activist Sabry al-Ghoul 
from the Sinai Peninsula or the student 
Islam Ateeto, are a particularly powerful 
deterrent. 
Eyes Wide Shut on Egypt 
Hardliners in Egypt are strengthened among 
other things by the fact that the step-by-step 
transition to routine repression has so far 
had hardly any negative consequences in-
ternationally. Quite the contrary: the desire 
of Western states to normalize relations 
with the Sisi regime is shown in their politi-
cally willed, large investments in Egypt’s 
energy sector, as well as the resumption of 
military aid and security cooperation. This 
impression is further strengthened by ques-
tionable measures – such as the temporary 
imprisonment of the Al-Jazeera journalist 
and critic of the regime, Ahmed Mansour, 
in Berlin – which suggested close coordina-
tion of the German authorities with the 
Egyptian security apparatus. The official 
receptions accorded to President al-Sisi in 
Madrid, Berlin and soon London also reha-
bilitate the Egyptian dictatorship on the 
international scene, and send the signal 
that Europe prioritizes cooperation in secu-
rity and economic affairs over respect for 
human rights. During her visit to the eco-
nomic summit in Sharm-el-Sheikh in March 
2015, the EU’s High Representative for For-
eign Affairs, Federica Mogherini, assured 
the Egyptian leadership of Europe’s con-
tinued support, without even addressing 
the human rights situation. Wherever criti-
cism has been voiced, it has been largely 
limited to condemning the hundreds of 
death sentences that have been handed 
down against opponents of the regime 
since the summer of 2013 – although even 
here there has been a process of habitua-
tion, so that new verdicts in mass trials no 
longer cause any diplomatic consequences 
above the level of verbal notes. Representa-
tives of the Egyptian regime routinely play 
down any criticism, pointing out that Egypt 
enjoys a separation of powers – an argument 
that is frequently and uncritically accepted 
by international partners despite their 
knowledge of Egypt’s politicized judiciary. 
What Role for Germany and the EU? 
The repressive approach of the authorities 
in Cairo works against Germany’s and the 
EU’s declared intent of stabilizing the coun-
try. Such stabilization is highly unlikely 
to succeed without a vibrant civil society to 
represent the interests of all segments of 
the population and demand good govern-
ance. Instead, the severe restriction of the 
public sphere and the brutal approach 
of the security apparatus sow the seeds of 
political violence. Escalation becomes more 
likely as peaceful expressions of opposition 
and non-violent mechanisms for conflict 
resolution are repressed. 
Germany and its European partners 
should therefore not stop at their princi-
pled criticism of the death penalty, but 
should strongly condemn both mock trials 
and extrajudicial repression as well. Fur-
thermore, they need to judge the leader-
ship in Cairo by how well it respects the 
2014 Constitution, which guarantees 
citizens’ freedom of assembly and asso-
ciation (articles 73 and 75) and ties the con-
duct of the state to international human 
rights conventions (article 93) that have 
been ratified by Egypt, such as the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. 
Germany and its European partners 
should not cooperate with Egypt’s internal 
security institutions. This specifically in-
cludes fighting terror, for as long as Egypt 
uses vaguely worded criminal law to per-
secute even peaceful opponents as terror-
ists. Cooperating with Egyptian State Secu-
rity and the domestic security services is 
out of the question while these institutions 
remain primarily responsible for the grave 
human rights situation in the country. Any 
thought of overcoming these repressive ten-
SWP Comments 41 
August 2015 
8 
dencies by providing training and equip-
ment, or through workshops, is as absurd 
as the idea of enshrining accountability 
mechanisms in such a way. 
Instead, NGOs need to be supported in 
their work wherever they continue to carry 
out effective monitoring of human rights 
violations despite the growing personal 
risk, and thus take on the role of scrutiniz-
ing government conduct. Alongside a few 
independent online editorial teams, such as 
the journalists’ collective Mada Masr, they 
have become the only reliable source of 
information on corruption, abuses of state 
power, and other systematic violations of 
collective and individual human rights. 
A closer alignment of supportive meas-
ures with the needs and legal status of local 
organizations would be crucial, but access to 
Egyptian HROs has worsened dramatically. 
On the one hand, they fear being accused 
of espionage, while on the other they have 
become suspicious of foreign support 
because of the West’s policy of rapproche-
ment with the Sisi regime. The revision 
of the criminal law has strongly limited pos-
sibilities for directly funding local projects 
in particular. Indeed, by giving material 
help and financial contributions, foreign 
partners risk handing the authorities a 
legal pretext for prosecuting the benefi-
ciaries. The same is true for indirect help 
through issuing service contracts. 
However, there still are some channels 
for promoting civil society. It should be 
explored whether it is possible to provide 
local venues for civil society exchanges, 
which have been in short supply since the 
implementation of the assembly law. Alter-
natively, such forums could also be offered 
outside Egypt to promote closer coordina-
tion between activists, who have thus far 
only been loosely cooperating with one 
another. This could be accompanied by 
workshops abroad on improving network-
ing, for instance in public relations and 
legal support, or data encryption and secure 
forms of communication. A few instances 
already exist of bilateral cooperation be-
tween Egyptian NGOs and partner organi-
zations in the wider Arab world. However, 
many NGOs would like to have closer ex-
changes with European groups, among 
other reasons to prevent a regime-coopted, 
façade civil society from establishing itself 
as the West’s interlocutor. 
Not least, civil society groups point to a 
huge need for professional care by psycholo-
gists and therapists. Almost all NGOs com-
plain of stress and staff shortages because 
of depression, burnout and traumatization 
caused by personal or mediated experiences 
of suffering. For women’s activists groups 
this has an additional gender component, 
since female activists frequently keep their 
experiences of violence silent for fear of 
social stigmatization. Thought needs to be 
given to how psychological care might be 
offered. Not only could this tie into the 
experience of the German Ministry for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development with 
traumatized civil-war victims, but support 
from medical and psychological services 
should also meet with less resistance from 
the Egyptian authorities because of the 
technical nature of such help. 
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